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The panel's approach in this case leads to the result that regulating the taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons of its own,
lives its entire life in California constitutes regulating "Commerce . .. among the several States." U.S. Constitution, art. I,
§ 8, cz. 3.
Rancho Viejo v. Norton, (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)]

I.

INTRODUCTION

Judge, now Chief Justice, John G. Roberts, Jr., does seem to
have a point, even if "for reasons of [his] own," he makes it
obliquely. It is, at the very least, not immediately obvious to those
not steeped in constitutional law, let alone Supreme Court Commerce Clause precedent, that persons engaging in the "taking" of
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This article is based on a talk
presented at a conference entitled "Environmental Letters, Environmental Law" held at
the University of Virginia on October 6-7, 2005. I would like to thank Professor Jonathan
Cannon for inviting me to speak at that conference and also to Professors Holly Doremus
and Peter Brooks for providing commentary on my presentation. I would also like to
thank Abby DeShazo and Kelly Falls, both Georgetown University Law Center Class of
2007, for their excellent research assistance.
1 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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toads are necessarily engaging in "commerce" let alone "Commerce ... among the several States" within the meaning of the
federal Constitution's Commerce Clause. 2
Of all of his judicial writings, moreover, hardly any appear to
have stirred as much controversy during his recent Senate confirmation process as this single sentence included in a dissent from a
denial of rehearing en bane. Four senators questioned him at
length about his reference to the "hapless toad," and several of the
witnesses at the hearings offered their competing interpretations of
the opinion's significance. 3 Many commentators, including some
environmentalists, sharply condemned then-Judge Roberts. They
predicted that these words portended his inclination to strike down
not only the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA)4 as unconstitutional, which was the legal issue raised in the Rancho Viejo v.
Norton case, but much federal civil rights law and modern welfare
legislation as welP Other environmentalists, however, disputed
such a characterization of his words, finding instead reasons for
possible cautious optimism. 6 At the Senate hearing itself, Judge
Roberts stressed that the dissent's discussion of the "hapless toad"
was included in an opinion that did no more than dissent from
denial of rehearing en bane in a case raising the constitutionality of
the ESA and never purported to address the merits of that constitutional claim.? The dissent concluded only that the full court
should decide the legal issue, rather than just a three-judge panets
Chief Justice Roberts also pointed out that he did not join a sepaU.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, c1. 3.
See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice
of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo 226, 264, 405, 511,
515, 530 (2005) (hereinafter cited as "Roberts Senate Confirmation Hearings").
4 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
5 ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN G. ROBERTS TO THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 2-3 (2005) ("In the same vein, in his very first opinion
on the bench, Judge Roberts dissented to express an exceedingly restrictive view of Congress' authority to enact important regulatory legislation. He suggested that Congress did
not have power under the Constitution's Commerce Clause to protect what he called a
"hapless toad" through endangered species law. . . . Judge Roberts' apparent view of
Congress' authority potentially threatens a wide swath of legislation rooted in the Commerce Clause, including civil rights safeguards, minimum wage and maximum hour laws,
clean air, clean water, and workplace safety protections.") Environmental public interest
groups that belong to the Alliance of Justice include the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and EarthJustice Legal Defense Fund, Inc. See http://www.afj.org/membership/
membership_organizations/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
6 Douglas T. Kendall, What Makes Roberts Different, WASH. POST, July 24, 2005, at B7.
7 Roberts Senate Confirmation Hearings, supra note 3, at 226, 264, 405.
8 Rancho Viejo V. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
2

3
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rate dissenting opinion that addressed the merits and contended
that the ESA was unconstitutiona1. 9
The purpose of this essay is not to address the merits of the controversy concerning what constitutes the fairest reading of Chief
Justice Roberts's words as an appellate judge. Nor is it to address
the underlying legal issue itself concerning the constitutionality of
the ESA as a valid exercise of congressional Commerce Clause
authority. This essay is differently directed. It addresses a broader
issue about environmental law well highlighted by the toad controversy: why is it that environmental law is so frequently mired by
legal disputes wherein the legal issues being debated seem so far
afield from what is truly. important?
Why does the constitutionality of the ESA turn on the notion
that preventing species' extinction is regulation of commerce? Yet,
that is the common ground of all the judges and opposing advocates in Rancho Viejo and the several other federal courts of
appeals cases addressing the ESA's constitutionality.Io Why does
the ability of an environmentalist to bring a lawsuit to prevent the
extinction of a species in another part of the world turn, as the
Supreme Court held in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife in 1992,11 on
whether the citizen-plaintiff environmentalist can produce a plane
ticket showing that she has recently visited the species or has discrete plans to visit the species in the very near future? And why
does the Clean Water Act strictly regulate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters to protect their physical, chemical, and
biological integrity, but fail to regulate withdrawals from those
same waters notwithstanding their equal potential to destroy the
waters' essential aquatic character?12
Environmental law is full of these seemingly nonsensical riddles.
They share, however, a common answer rooted in the challenges
presented for environmental law by human nature, the laws of
nature, and the nature of the nation's lawmaking institutions. This
essay explores the role that all three play in environmental law and
how the interrelated difficulties presented by each are reflected in
9 Roberts Senate Confirmation Hearings, supra note 3, at 226, 405; see Norton, 334 F.3d
at 1158-60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
10 Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty Invs. v.
Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 640-41 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g en bane denied, 362 F.3d 286, 287 (5th
Cir. 2004) (Jones, Jolly, Smith, DeMoss, Clement, and Pickering, n., dissenting); Gibbs v.
Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat'! Home Builders Ass'n v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041,
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
11 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992).
12 See 33 U.S.c. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
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the kinds of legal issues that surround environmental lawmaking.
The essay also discusses how these same difficulties impede environmental lawmaking by obscuring from lawmakers, judges, and
the general population what is truly important about environmental law.
The essay is divided into three parts. Part I considers the ways in
which the need for environmental law derives from the tendency of
human nature to cause adverse environmental consequences and
the ways in which the laws of nature make it more difficult to prevent those consequences absent the imposition of external legal
rules.13 Part II describes how our nation's lawmaking institutions
are similarly challenged by the laws of nature. 14 This includes a
discussion of how the kinds of laws necessary to bridge the gap
between human nature and the laws of nature are systematically
difficult for our lawmaking institutions to develop in the first
instance and to maintain over time. Part III takes a closer look at
one of the nation's most important legal institutions-the United
States Supreme Court-and briefly discusses both its past shortcomings in environmental lawmaking and its potential in the
future. I5 This part of the essay includes some analysis of the
Court's deliberations in specific environmental cases, as revealed
by the recently disclosed official papers of Justice Harry Blackmun.
II.

HUMAN NATURE AND THE LAWS OF NATURE

"To enjoy freedom, we have to control ourselves."
Virginia Wolff

Some environmental pollution is, of course, unavoidable. Basic
human life requires the consumption of the surrounding natural
environment. While the First Law of Thermodynamics provides
for the conservation of energy (and classical physics for the conservation Of mass),16 the Second Law provides for the inevitable
increases in entropy that result from human activityP The term
"entropy" refers to the degree of disorder in a system. For
instance, as energy is transformed from one form to another, some
See infra text accompanying notes 16-4l.
See infra text accompanying notes 42-72.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 73-127.
16 2 RAYMOND A. SERWAY & JOHN W. JEWEIT,
ed.2002).
17 [d. at 643.
13

14

JR., PRINCIPLES OF PHYSICS
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energy is lost as heat; as the energy decreases, the disorder in the
system, and hence the entropy, increases. IS
Natural resource destruction and environmental contamination
is a form of entropy. Disorder in the ecosystem is increased when
common resources such as air and water are polluted. Disorder is
likewise increased whenever complex natural resources are broken
down into smaller parts.
In consuming natural resources to provide the basic necessities
of energy, food, shelter, and clothing, humankind necessarily
increases entropy in parts of the ecosystem in the form of polluted
global resources and destroyed natural resources. Fundamental
human biological processes compel it. Human life depends, as life
does in many animals, on a series of chemical reactions within the
cells of the human body capable of breaking down complex chemical compounds such as glucose into its component parts of carbon
dioxide and water. 19 The technical name of the necessary biochemical process for the breakdown of glucose is carbohydrate catabolism, which itself consists of three major stages: glycosis, citric acid
cycle (known as the "Krebs cycle") and phosphorylation. 20 For the
purposes of this essay, however, what is important for the nonscientific reader to understand is how these many biochemical
processes ultimately depend on the breaking down of more complex and ordered chemical compounds into less complex and more
disordered chemical elements. Some natural resource destruction
and environmental pollution are necessarily implicated by such
processes. As energy is transformed from one form to another,
natural resources are consumed and contamination of existing natural resources results.
To the extent, moreover, that it is human nature to seek to survive, it is human nature to undertake activities that cause such natural resource destruction and environmental pollution. That
central threshold proposition should be noncontroversial. What is
no doubt more controversial is whether it is similarly human nature
to consume the natural environment in a nonsustainable fashion.
Garrett Hardin's classic article "The Tragedy of the Commons,"
published in Science in 1968,21 offers a disturbing answer to that
18

Id. at 638-43.

19 3 PHYSIOLOGY AND BIOPHYSICS: DIGESTION, METABOLISM, ENDOCRINE FUNCTION
AND REPRODUCTION 90-91 (Theodore C. Ruch & Harr D. Patton eds., 20th ed. 1973).
20 LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 349-426 (3d ed. 1988).
21 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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question. Although Hardin's central thesis is well-known, it is
worth emphasis here by repetition:
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a
pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman
will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons.
Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for
centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep
the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying
capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of
reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of
social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent
logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his
gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he
asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal
to my herd?" . .. [T]he rational herdsman concludes that
the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another
animal to his herd. And another. .. But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into
a system that compels him to increase his herd without
limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination
toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. 22
Hardin describes his thesis in the limited context of human
nature faced with a pasture for animal grazing, but it all too easily
extends with potentially catastrophic results to many contemporary
environmental settings. The expansive reach of modern technology has turned the once seemingly infinite into the finite. Populations of ocean fisheries can be irreversibly destroyed.
Underground aquifers of drinking water supplies can be forever
lost. And, of course, potentially destructive global climate change
may occur from increased loadings of carbon to the atmosphere
from anywhere in the globe.
Modern technology also has its limits, as the nation was tragically reminded in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina this past
year. Modern technology allowed for the development of a major
metropolitan area where nature, standing alone, would have precluded any such possibility. New Orleans was largely below sea
level and existed only by grace of a complex series of levees
22

[d. at 1244.

HeinOnline -- 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 236 2005-2006

2005]

The Nature of Environmental Law

237

designed to keep water from flowing along its natural course.
Even when properly constructed, such levees are no match, however, for the enormous force of hurricanes like Katrina, especially
when thousands of acres of surrounding wetlands, which might
have otherwise provided some natural protection from flood
waters, are filled to satisfy ever-rising demands for residential,
commercial, and industrial development. The upshot: the devastation of a city, the loss of human life, and the destruction of an
invaluable aquatic ecosystem by floodwaters laden with toxic
contaminants. 23
Hardin's central insight regarding the implications of human
nature for the natural environment extends much further, however,
than to just the potential tragic destruction of resource commons.
Each of the individual actors in Hardin's proffered tragedy cause
ruin to all because of their inability to look beyond the here and
now. They perceive well their own, present short-term needs.
They are unable to apprehend and take into account the longerterm implications for individual persons at other times or in other
places. Even if presented by information detailing those broader
spatial and temporal impacts, they would be unable on their own to
temper their own immediate actions as necessary to avoid the
resource common's tragic destruction. The risks facing New Orleans have been well-known for decades. Yet, short-term needs
always trumped government's willingness and ability to expend the
massive resources necessary to guard against long-term, low-risk
events, even if of potentially catastrophic consequences.z4
More recent research into behavioral psychology and human
cognitive biases offers contemporary confirmation of Hardin's
basic thesis. Experimental research shows that humans strongly
favor avoidance of immediate costs over less immediate, longerterm, and distant risks. Dubbed by some a "myopia" bias, scien23 Felicity Barringer & Michael Janofsky, E.P.A. Struggles to Determine Extent of
Hazards in Sludge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005, at A24; Dan Barry, A Black-Green Curtain
of Disease and Destruction, Grime and Stench, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,2005, at A16; Sewell
Chan & Andrew Revkin, Water Returned to Lake Pontchartrain Contains Toxic Material,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A18; Ian Urbina & Mathew Wald, Residents Worry About the
Threat of Hazardous Chemicals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,2005, at A20.
24 Peter Applebome, Christopher Drew, Jere Longman and Andrew C. Revkin, A Delicate Balance is Undone in a Flash, and a Battered City Waits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, § 1,
at 25; Adam Cohen, If the Big One Hits the Big Easy, the Good Times May Be Over Forever, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11,2002, § 4, at 12 (editorial page); Christopher Drew & Andrew
Revkin, Design Flaws Seen in New Orleans Flood Walls, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, at A4;
Jon Nordheimer, Nothing's Easy for New Orleans Flood Control, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
2002, at Flo
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tists argue that a strong basic desire to avoid immediate costs is
present throughout nature and is deeply rooted in evolutionary
biology.25
Others similarly argue that human genetic evolution has systematically favored consumerism and materialism, i.e., the so-called
"selfish gene. "26 When, over thousands of years ago, human beings
relied on hunting and gathering to get their next meal, long-term
planning was of little value. After all, without a means of preserving food, there was little reason to plan. It was better to consume
what one found when one found it, especially when there was no
assurance that more would be found tomorrow. "Our brains were
built for a world in which the currency of the day did lose value
over time. Put simply: food rotS."27 "[N]ature created within us a
short-sighted set of moral instincts."28
Selfish shortsightedness and materialism became dominant tendencies in the competition with other species for survival. "Rather
than leave some precious energy lying around to mold or be stolen,
put it in your stomach and have your body convert the food into an
energy savings account. "29 The drive for survival arguably
extended to the production of heirs-survival by the passing of
genes to one's children-and the accumulation of material wealth
often seen as a necessary prerequisite for successful reproduction. 3D
And, "even though wealth may not relate to babies in an industrialized world, our instincts come from a time when concerns over
material possessions were crucial."31 One commentator has gone
so far as to suggest, provocatively, that "[h]uman failings, such as
those that some call the Seven Deadly Sins, may all derive from
our evolutionary traps. "32
But, whatever the origins of humanity's limited spatial and temporal horizons, the laws of nature do not limit their potentially
tragic consequences to classic resource commons or to guarding
25 David A. Dana, A Behavorial Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 1315, 1324-26 (2003).
26 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
27 TERRY BURNHAM & JAY PHELAN, MEAN GENES 30 (2001).
28 P. Wesley Edwards, A Darwinian Approach to Metaethics, Freethought Debater,
updated Aug. 21, 2004, http://www.freethoughtdebater.comIFEvolutionaryEthics.htm
(lasted visited Mar. 16, 2006).
29 BURNHAM & PHELAN, supra note 27, at 19.
30 MICHAEL RUSE, TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY 231 (1986).
31 BURNHAM & PHELAN, supra note 27, at 120.
32 Michael J. Chapman, Hominid Failings: An Evolutionary Basis for Sin in Individuals
and Corporations, in EVOLUTION AND ETHICS: HUMAN MORALITY IN BIOLOGICAL AND
RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE 101, 103 (Philip Clayton & Jeffrey Schloss eds., 2004).

HeinOnline -- 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 238 2005-2006

2005]

The Nature of Environmental Law

239

against catastrophic events such as hurricanes. The laws of nature
constantly spread out ecological cause and effect in a spatial and
temporal manner that poses analogous problems for humankind.
Global and local wind patterns push the consequences of activities
in one place to increasingly distant locations. The natural movement of water does the same. But so too do the host of chemical
cycles that link together through chemical processes seemingly disparate aspects of the ecosystem. The hydrologic cycle (water) is
simply the best known of many.33 There are a host of such chemical cycles: in addition to the carbon cycle related to questions about
global climate change,34 there are nitrogen,35 sulfur36 and phosphorous cycles?7 The implication of each is that individual activities in one place have consequences in other places and at other
times.
The need for environmental law can be seen as arising from the
persistent gap between the spatial and temporal horizons of human
nature and the much wider and longer spatial and temporal dimensions of the consequences of human activities because of the laws
of nature. Within the narrower context of The Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin referred to the need to "legislate temperance."38 He
contended that freedom, ironically, necessitated "mutual coercion
mutually agreed upon. "39
That is, of course, modern environmental law's central mission.
Environmental law seeks to regulate activities that occur in the
here and now to temper their potentially tragic consequences for
the there and then. Human nature will not do it on its own, which
is why formal legal rules become necessary. To be sure, our willingness to embrace such coercive laws may be viewed as expressing
another competing, sometimes seemingly dormant, aspect of
human nature: a potential willingness to cooperate for the longerterm good of all. And, there are evolutionary biologists and economists who contend that human nature has the potential for
extending beyond short-sighted self interest and to extend to coop33

See generally

ELIZABETH

K.

BERNER

&

ROBERT A. BERNER, GLOBAL ENVIRON.

2-23 (1996).
Id. at 29-34; see also Peter M. Vitousek, Beyond Global Warming: Ecology and
Global Change, 75 ECOLOGY 1861, 1862-65 (1994).
35 BERNER & BERNER, supra note 33, at 142-46; Vitousek, supra note 34, at 1865-70.
36 BERNER & BERNER, supra note 33, at 142-46.
37 Id.
38 Hardin, The Tragedy of Commons, supra note 21, at 1245-46.
39 Id. at 1247.
MENT: WATER, AIR, AND GEOCHEMICAL CYCLES
34

HeinOnline -- 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 239 2005-2006

240

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 24:231

eration and reciprocal altruism. 40 Even so, environmental protection rules are inherently coercive to the extent that they seek to
cause people to act in ways contrary to their more atomized, natural individual tendencies. 41
Environmental law's challenge, therefore, is to realize Hardin's
vision of "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon." This is hardly
an attractive, aspirational objective. Nor is it easy to accomplish.
It is not easy to pass laws that regulate human activities at one time
and place for the benefit of human activities (let alone nonanthropocentric and ecocentric values) at another time and place. It is
especially difficult because the further that the laws of nature
spread cause and effect out over time and space, the more scientific
uncertainty there will be regarding whether the adverse environmental effects projected in the future will in fact ever happen and
whether the adverse environmental effects perceived today were in
fact caused by specific activities in distant locations and times.
It is not easy for any lawmaking system to agree upon laws that
are mutually coercive under such circumstances. As discussed
below, the United States is no exception. 42

III.

THE NATURE OF THE NATION's LAWMAKING INSTITUTIONS

Environmental law seeks to fill gaps created by the differing spatial and temporal horizons of human nature and the laws of nature,
but the challenge of environmental lawmaking is further increased
by the nature of the nation's lawmaking institutions. Most simply
stated, those lawmaking institutions make it systematically hard to
enact laws that fill the necessary gaps. The various challenges are
rooted in the structure of those institutions, constitutional limitations on government lawmaking, and electoral politics.

40 See generally Robert Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35 (1971); ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); MATTHEW
RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 53-66 (1996). Professor Thomas Schelling, the most
recent winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in economics is one of the leading economic
game theorists on the role of cooperation in human behavior. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE (1984).
41 Matthew Ridley & Bobbi S. Low, Can Selfishness Save the Environment?, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Sept. 1993, at 76.
42 The challenge for lawmaking systems to make environmental law is discussed at
greater length in my recent book, RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMEN.
TAL LAW 29-42 (2004).
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Structure of Lawmaking Institutions

The defining characteristic of our nation's lawmaking institutions
is fragmentation. By deliberate design, our lawmaking institutions
are fragmented to avoid the concentration of lawmaking power
and thereby reduce the risk of its abuse and corruption. Lawmaking authority is fragmented horizontally between branches of government-executive, legislative, and judicial-with "checks and
balances" designed to allow each branch some ability to guard
against excesses in the others.
The horizontal fragmentation, moreover, does not end at the
border of each of the three branches. Within each branch, there is
further fragmentation. For instance, while the President is the
Chief Executive, executive branch lawmaking authority is, often as
a matter of law and even more often as a practical matter, the
responsibility of different cabinet agencies and departments. These
agencies approach issues from very different policy perspectives
related to their competing, and sometimes opposing, missions.
The Environmental Protection Agency and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) are, for instance, both within the
executive branch and both report to the President. But their views
on environmental protection issues have tended to begin from different policy premises, use different analytic frameworks, and seek
to further different substantive ends. OMB is naturally more concerned with immediate, short-term economic costs and more willing to discount costs in distant times and places, especially those
not readily subject to monetization.
Lawmaking authority is also fragmented vertically, with lawmaking authority allocated between federal, state, tribal, and local governmental authorities. Here too the design is deliberate and
largely intended to avoid the potential abuses of undue concentration of lawmaking power in a centralized authority. The Constitution does not confer general lawmaking authority on the federal
government, but instead limits the government to discrete categories of lawmaking power while reserving the remainder to the
States, whose essential sovereignty the Constitution in turn seeks
to safeguard. For instance, Congress has lawmaking authorities
under Article I of the Constitution related to spending, managing
property, raising revenues, and regulating commerce between
Indian tribes, States, and foreign nations. 43 But the Supreme Court
has long held that Congress lacks general police power authority to
43

U.S.

CONST.,

art. I, § 8, d. 1, 3.
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enact laws designed to promote the health, safety, and welfare of
the American people. 44 The Tenth Amendment expressly reserves
general lawmaking authorities to the States,45 which the Supreme
Court has interpreted to further limit federal governmental
encroachment on essential attributes of state sovereignty, including
a prohibition on federal commandeering of state lawmaking
authority.46
The historic reasons for such fragmentation are well known: to
guard against a repeat of the kind of centralization of lawmaking
authority by distant governments against which the nation rebelled
in its founding.47 But no matter how meritorious the reasons, the
implications for environmental lawmaking are no less substantial.
All fragmentation makes it more difficult to enact comprehensive laws and to make ongoing revisions to legal rules in light of
new information. Moreover, because of the way that the laws of
nature ensure that cause and effect in the ecosystem are spread out
over time and space, fragmented lawmaking authorities are not
likely to have the necessary jurisdiction over both the cause and
effect. As a consequence, those concerned about the adverse
effects may have no jurisdiction over the cause and those with
jurisdiction over the cause may have no political accountability to
those suffering the adverse effects.
Downstream and downwind jurisdictions invariably approach
environmental protection matters from a different perspective than
upstream and upwind jurisdictions. Neither is well situated to
determine the applicable environmental protection rules for the
other. This is true when "down" and "up" refer to their relative
spatial location, and the simple mechanics of an upstream source of·
pollution cause adverse· consequences in downstream locations.
This is no less true when, given the expansive scope of modern
industrial technology, the "down" and "up" refer to relative temporal dimensions and activities that can have devastating, irreversible effects realized only in the distant future.

44 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (discussing limitations on
federal police power, citing Nat'l Relations Labor Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 30 (1937); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995».
45 U.S. CONST., amend. X.
46 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
47 See 1 RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 3.12 (West 1986).
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Constitutional Limitations on Governmental Lawmaking

The Constitution's concern with excessive governmental overreaching extends beyond its assignment of lawmaking authority
between the three branches in the first three Articles and its general reservation of authority to the States. The Bill of Rights is
exclusively directed to limitations on the exercise of governmental
authority: the federal government in the first instance and, by way
of the Fourteenth Amendment selectively applied, to state government as well. To the extent that each of these constitutional
amendments makes lawmaking more difficult, they also make environmental lawmaking more difficult. For instance, criminal
enforcement of environmental protection laws must, like all criminal prosecution, work within the constitutional bounds established
by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures48 and the Fifth Amendment's right against selfincrimination. 49
But apart from this generic effect, there are several specific
amendments within the Bill of Rights that raise heightened challenges for environmental lawmakers in particular. The Fifth
Amendment's protections against deprivation of property without
due process of law and its ban on takings of private property for
public use without just compensation are two obvious examples. 50
Environmental protection laws, whether aimed at preventing species extinction, water degradation, or air pollution, frequently
restrict the exercise of property rights in natural resources because
of the impact of that exercise at other times and places.
Here too, the laws of nature do not confine the impacts of an
owner's use of her property to the property itself or the owner's
own lifetime. It is quite the opposite. Wind, water, and the many
chemical cycles that make up the ecosystem ensure that there will
be temporal and spatial spillover effects. Yet for that same reason,
efforts to guard against those effects through environmental regulations tend to generate claims of government deprivations of private property or, in especially harsh circumstances, regulatory
"takings" of property. It is no coincidence that the legal fountainhead of the modern regulatory takings doctrine, Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, decided by the Supreme Court in 1922,51 arose in a
48

u.s. Const., amend. IV.

U.S. CONST., amend. V.
so Id.
S! 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
49
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case where a property owner challenged the constitutionality of a
restriction on coal mining under the Fifth Amendment Takings
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. This coal mining restriction was a regulatory precursor to the kinds of restrictions found
throughout environmental protection law today.
Finally, there are distinct features of our political process that
render environmental lawmaking problematic, again because of
the ways that the laws of nature ensure a spreading out of cause
and effect in the ecosystem. We elect our President to a four-year
term and members of what are supposed to be our nation's most
important lawmaking bodies (Congress and state legislatures) to
serve relatively short terms (e.g., six, four, two years). The reason
for the relatively short length is straightforward: to increase their
accountability and therefore their possible responsiveness to the
current voters in their relevant legislative district.
But such short-term and more narrowly defined electoral
responsiveness necessarily places environmental protection concerns at a disadvantage. An elected representative is held accountable for things happening right now and affecting constituents in a
discrete place. In short, the "here" and "now" are the voters,
which makes it hard for elected representatives to focus on the
"there" and the "then." Not only are the voters necessarily limited
to the here and now, so, too, tend to be those monied interests that
fund political campaigns. To be sure, there are eleemosynary organizations that possess the longer-term and broader perspectives,
but the resources available to those organizations tend to be far
less than that which is available to those organizations concerned
with more immediate needs.
Environmental lawmaking within this constitutional framework
and through these political processes is, accordingly, systematically
disadvantaged. It constantly runs into obstacles, sometimes pitting
one branch of government against another,52 sometimes prompting
conflicts between different parts of the same branch,53 and just as
often generating conflicts between competing sovereigns: between
52 See, e.g., John H. Cushman, Jr., Congressional Republicans Take Aim at an Extensive
List of Environmental Statutes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,2005, at A14; John H. Cushman, Jr.,
Senate Backs Cuts in Environmental Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,1995, at A35; John H.
Cushman, Jr., The 104th Congress: The Environment; House Approves Sweeping Changes
on Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at AI; Editorial, The G.O.P. 's War on Nature,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1995, at A20; Jerry Gray, In House, Spending Bills Open Way to Make
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1995, at A16.
53 Robert V. Percival, Checks without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1991).

HeinOnline -- 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 244 2005-2006

2005]

The Nature of Environmental Law

245

the federal and state government;54 between state governments;55
or between state, tribal, and local governments. 56 Indeed, the past
several decades of environmental lawmaking are littered with such
cases. Returning to scientific analogies for a moment, it is akin to
the phenomenon known as "friction" in classic Newtonian mechanics: physical movement cannot occur absent some friction. It
requires contact, whether to a greater or lesser extent, between at
least two competing surface areas. 57
The making of environmental law also depends on movement,
albeit of a different kind. To get a law enacted through the legislative process requires a host of distinct steps: a proposed bill moves
through the committee process, is considered by both chambers, is
subject to further debate and amendment in conference committee
and/or on the floor, and is finally sent to the President for signature
or possible veto. The promulgation of a rule within a federal
agency requires its own kind of movement: a rule is formally proposed and published in the federal register, public hearings may be
held, public comments are considered, the rule is revised, and the
final rule is ultimately published.
Relations between competing sovereigns present similar analogies. Congressional passage of a federal statute or a federal
agency's promulgation of a rule is typically one of the first of several subsequent steps that must take place, most often by state and
local government agencies and officials, before the relevant federal
statutory provision or regulation has any actual legal effect. Each
distinct step creates an opportunity for, analogous to Newtonian
mechanics, friction, as the various parts of the nation's lawmaking
apparatus grind out a law. The conflicts that surrounded the statute's initial enactment or a rule's promulgation follow it through
each implementing stage.
Modern environmental law's evolution in the United States during the past several decades is, accordingly, dominated by the political equivalent of heat in classical mechanics: conflict and
controversy. Many of the resulting disputes, when formally
expressed in lawsuits brought to the federal judiciary, arise out of
conflicts between lawmaking authorities within and between competing branches of government and sovereign authorities. As
54 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't. of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); Gade v. Nat'l Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
55 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
56 See, e.g., City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996).
57 1 SERWAY & JEWETT, supra note 16, at 139.
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opposing interest groups enlist different branches to champion
their concerns, the two branches clash. The same occurs when
opposing interests enlist different sovereigns as their champions.
While environmental concerns (primarily the distributional consequences of environmental protection laws) underlie the disputes,
the legal issues formally raised are rarely distinctly "environmental" in character. They instead concern jurisdictional disputes"separation of powers" between branches58 and "federalism"
between sovereigns59-as the courts try to sort out which branch or
sovereign'S position should prevail. Nor is there a consistent pattern in terms of whether the resolution of those jurisdictional disputes favors one set of environmental interests or another. There
is just the converse.
At various times in the nation's history, greater executive branch
autonomy has favored stronger environmental protection laws, as
the legislative branch sought to promote the interests of those
favoring their relaxation. 60 But at other times, environmentalists
have favored more assertion of legislative control and a tightening
of the reins on the executive branch. 61 Similar themes are evident
in the area of federalism, defining the lawmaking border between
the federal and state government and between competing state
governments. Sometimes environmentalists favor a stronger federal government, overriding state autonomy,62 and other times they
trumpet the sovereign authority of states to impose more environmentally protective requirements. 63 While the precise source of
the difference in viewpoint can often be explained by whether a
state is downstream or downwind rather than upstream or upwind,
the federalism issues are the same, making it impossible to find any
consistently principled legal view of federalism being advocated by
anyone in environmental disputes.
Although the docket of the United States Supreme Court is
infinitesimally small (only about eighty cases a year) relative to the
huge number of cases heard by federal and state trial courts, the
Court's docket illustrates the jurisdictional character of the enviSee, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001).
60 See LAZARUS, supra note 42, at 131.
61 [d. at 99-113.
62 See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696 (1978).
63 See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246
(2004).
58
59
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ronmental cases most likely to be before the High Court. For
instance, during the political imbroglio surrounding Anne Gorsuch's tenure as EPA Administrator during the Reagan Administration in the early 1980s, the issue reaching the Supreme Court in
Morrison v. Olson concerned the constitutionality of a federal statute authorizing the creation of an Independent Counsel to investigate and potentially prosecute wrongdoing by high-ranking
executive branch officials. 64 In that instance, the Independent
Counsel was investigating possible criminal violations associated
with the executive branch's refusal to turn over certain agency documents that Congress sought in order to determine whether the
EPA had committed malfeasance in its enforcement (or alleged
lack thereof) of federal environmentallaws. 65
The vast majority of environmental law cases before the
Supreme Court are similarly focused on jurisdictional disputes
between competing lawmaking authorities. There have been a host
of cases considering whether state laws designed to limit the disposal of waste within their borders are unconstitutional on the ground
that they amount to undue burdens on interstate commerce outside
the scope of state lawmaking authority under the federal Constitution. 66 There have likewise been many cases concerned with the
federal government's ability to oversee state implementation of
environmental law, ranging from cases in which the federal government seeks to enlist state aid in the implementation of federal
law,67 cases in which states seek to impose more stringent requirements on commercial activities than those imposed by federal
law,68 and cases in which the federal government seeks to oversee
or override state implementation of federal environmental law. 69
Finally, there are many cases raising separation of powers issues:
the legislative branch seeking to oversee the work of the judicial or
executive branch;70 the legislative branch, conversely, seeking to

u.s. 654 (1988).

64

487

65

[d. at 665-68.
See, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Land-

66

fill v. Mich. Dep't. of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
67 See, e.g., Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 226 (4th Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d
827, 838-42 (9th Cir. 1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 977 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
68 See, e.g., Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987); Pub. Util.
Dist. No.1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
69 See, e.g., Alaska v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
70 See, e.g., Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).

HeinOnline -- 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 247 2005-2006

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

248

[Vol. 24:231

delegate lawmaking authority to the executive branch;71 and the
judicial branch seeking to ensure that the executive branch's implementation of a federal environmental statute is consistent with congressional intent. 72
Because, however, so many environmental legal controversies
arise in a context in which the environmental character of the legal
issue presented is not front and center, there is a related risk that
the courts deciding these issues fail to apprehend that character
and its possible relevance to the issue's resolution. Indeed, as discussed below, the Supreme Court itself has failed in that precise
way. The Court seizes on the kinds of jurisdictional disputes that
dominate much of environmental law without any appreciation for
how and why the disputes are raised. And, as a result, the Court's
rulings all too often fall short.
IV.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT

As I have contended recently elsewhere at greater length,?3 my
own view is that much of the Supreme Court's recent environmental law precedent reflects a lack of appreciation of the special challenges presented by environmental lawmaking. The Court's
fundamental failure in this respect has prompted individual members of the Court to make a series of mistakes both at the jurisdictional stage and on the merits. In deciding whether to accept a
case for plenary review, the Court has been too willing to grant
petitions filed by parties who claim that environmental protection
laws are overreaching, which has led to an unfortunate skewing of
the Court's docket. Even to the extent that the Court's rulings on
the merits are more balanced than the grants of jurisdiction, the
Court has largely stood ready to correct lower court errors of only
one kind: regulatory overreaching and not regulatory
underreaching.
The gravamen of the error lies in the Justices' overreaction to
the legal issues generated by the process of environmentallawmaking. The Court fails to recognize these lawmaking issues as a
healthy byproduct of an important evolutionary process of enviSee, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
73 This portion of the essay both borrows from and builds upon my recent book chapter,
Richard J. Lazarus, The Nature of Environmental Law and the U.S. Supreme Court, in
71

72

STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE

(Michael Allan Wolf ed., Environmental Law Institute 2005).
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ronmentallawmaking that requires accommodation and reconciliation of jurisdictional disputes within and between branches and
competing sovereign authorities. Rather, the Justices perceive
environmental law, especially the pressures it places on other intersecting areas of law, as a destabilizing threat that needs cabining.
As a result, the Court has been more apt to retard from the outside
rather than to engage constructively from within the necessary evolutionary process being triggered by the demands for environmental lawmaking.
Claims that environmental protection laws amount to unconstitutional takings of private property, that environmental citizenplaintiffs lack the "concrete" injuries necessary for Article III
standing, or that federal environmental agencies are trampling
upon the sovereign prerogatives of the States, are all variants on a
common and related theme. Each of these disputes arises from the
way that the laws of nature make it difficult for our lawmaking
institutions to fashion environmental law. Wholly missing from the
Court's decisionmaking in such cases is any appreciation of the
broader legal evolutionary context.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Counci['4 is illustrative. That opinion invokes "background
principles" of the common law of tort and property law as the ultimate measures of the constitutionality of an environmental land
use restriction that deprives a landowner of all economically viable
use. 75 The ruling thereby ignores the underlying reasons for why
the law has needed to evolve away from those background principles in light of contemporary understanding of the need for
stronger environmental protection law.
The precise environmental restrictions at issue in Lucas barred
new coastal development in too close physical proximity to the
shore. 76 The state law was enacted in response to a nationwide
effort, triggered by federal coastal zone management policies, to
promote more careful development of coastal properties because
of their ecological fragility and their potential exposure to destructive storms. 77 Indeed, the kind of catastrophic damage caused
recently by Hurricane Katrina was one of the justifications cited by
505 u.s. 1003 (1992).
[d. at 1029.
76 [d. at 1007-09.
77 See Carol M. Rose, The Story o/Lucas: Environmental Land Use Regulation Between
Developers and the Deep Blue Sea, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 237, 258-61 (Richard
J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).
74

75
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the South Carolina Coastal Council in Lucas for the need to bar
new residential development in especially exposed locations. 78
The Supreme Court in Lucas lacked, however, the perspective
necessary to appreciate the justifications for a prospective change
in the rights of property owners to build homes in certain places.
The Court failed to see beyond the simple fact that the landowner
wanted to do nothing more than build a home as the others before
him had been allowed. The majority displayed no appreciation of
the propriety of rethinking private property rights in light of the
very real dangers created when fragile coastal zone ecosystems,
intensive residential development, and ocean storms are combined.
A recent dissent written by Justice Kennedy similarly reflects the
absence of the necessary broader perspective. Ever since joining
the Court in 1987, Justice Kennedy has been the most significant
Justice in environmental cases, at least to the extent that he has
been in the majority more often than any other Justice, often providing the decisive fifth vote. 79 The Court's recent Clean Air Act
decision in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v.
EPA,80 however, was one of those extremely rare circumstances
when Kennedy found himself on the dissenting side. 81
In Alaska, Justice Kennedy wrote for four Justices dissenting
from the majority's ruling that the EPA possessed the authority
under the Clean Air Act to second guess a state agency determination of what amounts to "best available control technology"82
applicable to a stationary source of pollution. While the precise
legal issue was highly technical and narrowly applicable, Justice
Kennedy's dissent struck much broader themes and relied on
remarkably strident rhetoric. The dissent accused the majority of
taking "a great step backward in Congress's design to grant States
a significant stake in developing and enforcing national environmental policy."83 The dissent further accused the Court of embrac-

78 Id. at 261-63; see Respondent's Brief at 28-35, Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992) (No. 91-453).
79 See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 712-15 (2000); Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and the Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 653,656
(2002).
80 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
81 Id. at 502 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
82 42 U.S.c. § 7479(3) (2000).
83 Alaska, 540 U.S. at 516 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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ing an unwarranted "presumption that state agencies are not to be
trusted to do their part. "84
Justice Kennedy's mistake was that he perceived an inroad on
federalism and a lack of trust of state sovereign authorities without
stepping back to consider the possible reasons for that inroad or
distrust. The Clean Air Act, like most federal environmental statutes, is deliberately and pervasively riddled with distrust. Its provisions do not fully trust state governments just like they do not fully
trust industry or the federal government.
There is, moreover, a reason for such congressional distrust.
Congress understood the powerful political and economic pressures that would be placed on agencies to compromise away environmental protection objectives during the implementation of
aspirational environmental laws such as the Clean Air Act that
sought to address diffuse interests. The legislators responded by
creating a multiplicity of checks and balances within the statutory
scheme. They provided for the EPA to review and approve State
implementation of the federal statute,85 and they authorized States
to sue the EPA for failing to abide by the Clean Air Act's requirements,86 including the federal agency's regulation (or lack of regulation) of upwind States. 87 And, of course, Congress included
powerful citizen-suit provisions in the Clean Air Act and virtually
all of the other federal environmental laws even to allow for some
citizen (and thereby judicial) oversight of the government's exercise of its enforcement authority. In short, what Justice Kennedy
perceived as a problem may have been better understood as a
solution.
Finally, the recently released papers of Justice Harry Blackmun
offer additional insight into the narrow nature of the Court's thinking and the need for the Justices to develop a broader theoretical
understanding of the nature of environmental lawmaking and the
demands of legal evolution.
When Justice Blackmun died in March 1999, his will provided
that the Library of Congress could make public his papers five
years after his death, which the Library did in March 2004. The
papers are voluminous in their number and even more extraordinary in terms of their revealing nature. They include more than
1,500 meticulously organized boxes of files containing documents
84
85

86
87

Id. at 507 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
42 U.S.c. § 7410 (2000).
Id. § 7604(e).
Id. § 7426.
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related to Blackmun's entire life, including his 23 years on the
Supreme Court from 1971 to 1994. The Library of Congress table
of contents for the files is 362 pages in itself.88
The documents related to his time on the Court tell a much fuller
story about the Court's decisionmaking process in individual cases
than ever before. While other Justices have previously released
their papers, none provided as much detail so quickly. Justice
Blackmun not only kept copies of all written memoranda prepared
within his own chambers, but also copies of all memoranda
received from other chambers and docket sheets recording all
votes at all stages in every case. Even more remarkably, he took
notes, purportedly verbatim, of what the Justices said at their Conference deliberations on cases being decided on the merits. Those
conferences are, by strict tradition, the most confidential of the
Court's proceedings. Only the Justices themselves are in attendance. Other Court personnel and law clerks to individual Justices
are not permitted in the room. 89
The Blackmun papers reveal Justices often discussing their own
views of the policy implications of an environmental ruling even
when those policy preferences should arguably be irrelevant to
their disposition of the legal issue before them. Many of those
individual policy preferences appear to be a reflection of the Justices' own life experiences, both personal and professional. The
papers therefore confirm the commonsense notion that a Justice's
own life experiences affect their perception of a case, even if not
always their ultimate vote. Justices' life experiences inevitably
affect their appreciation of the impacts of alternative rulings in the
real world. That, too, is human nature. And judges, even Supreme
Court Justices, are human.
88 Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Harry Blackmun - A Register of his
Papers in the Library of Congress (2003) (prepared by Connie L. Cartledge with the assistance of others).
89 The Blackmun Papers reveal much about the Court's deliberative process, but no
doubt the most revealing are Justice Blackmun's notes taken during the Conference on
what each Justice said. He wrote his Conference notes in his own distinct shorthand,
requiring some translation. Although Blackmun proffered these notes as verbatim quotes
of what the other Justices said, they remain his notes of what they said, rather than an
actual verbatim transcript by a disinterested professional reporter or a mechanical device.
There is, accordingly, an unlJ;voidable risk that Blackmun consciously or unconsciously
filtered the statements made by other members of the Court in a manner that distorts their
meaning. A fuller description of the Blackmun Papers, and related issues, is contained in a
forthcoming article, Richard J. Lazarus, The Measure of a Justice: Justice Scalia and the
Faltering of the Property Rights Movement within the Supreme Court, 57 Hastings L. J.
(forthcoming Apr. 2006).
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Justice Powell's vote in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City
of New York 90 is illustrative. In Penn Central, the Supreme Court
in 1978 rejected a takings challenge to New York City's historic
landmark designation of Grand Central Terminal. While on the
Court, Justice Powell was generally a stalwart advocate of business
interests and was concerned about the burdens that environmental
regulation placed on private property rights in particular and
American business in generaI.91 Yet, in Penn Central, Powell
joined Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority rejecting a regulatory takings claim based on the extent to which the City's historic
landmark designation prevented greater economic development of
Grand Central Station. 92 What the Blackmun Papers reveal is that
at the Conference, Justice Powell acknowledged a personal bias
favoring historic preservation laws based on his work in support of
Colonial Williamsburg in his home state of Virginia. 93
To similar effect is Justice Byron White's vote in United States v.
New Mexico. 94 Justice White was a westerner from Colorado,
where water can be scarce and water law, for that reason, is both
important and complex. At issue in United States v. New Mexico
was whether the federal government's reservation of land for the
establishment of a national forest included a reservation of those
waters necessary to maintain the general forest ecosystem. 95 The
federal government, supported by environmentalists, claimed that
the reservation extended to such expanded water rights, while the
State of New Mexico resisted that federal claim, leaving more
water available for allocation to private commercial interests. The
Court, in an opinion written by then-Justice Rehnquist, sided with
New Mexico that no such water rights were impliedly reserved on
behalf of the federal government. Justice White, along with two
other Justices, joined Justice Powell's dissent from that ruling,
which described at length the environmental harm to the forest
ecosystem that would result from a failure to provide adequate
water to maintain the forest's ecosystem. 96
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental about Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court, supra note 79, at 729-33.
92 438 U.S. at 107.
93 The B1ackmun Papers, Penn Central, No. 77-444, Conference Notes (Apr. 19, 1978)
(Container No. 273).
94 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
95 [d. at 697-98.
96 [d. at 718.
90

91
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According to the Blackmun Papers, however, Justice White originally voted at Conference with the majority to affirm the lower
court's ruling in favor of New Mexico. 97 White characterized the
case as involving "little water law" and just a matter of "statutory
construction."98 At the same time, he acknowledged that it "hurts
to affirm a bit" because the "States are dependent on tourism [and]
would cut their own throats if they let streams dry up. "99
It is impossible to know for sure whether the latter policy concerns are in fact what prompted Justice White subsequently to
switch his vote from the Rehnquist majority to the Powell dissent.
But White's letter to Justice Powell, formally joining the dissent,
certainly leaves that impression, albeit in tongue-in-cheek fashion:
"You have sold me on the birds and bees. Please join me in your
partial dissent. "100
Notably, however, most of the occasions when Justices expressed
concern with the policy implications of a particular ruling were
When their votes were inconsistent with those concerns. The Jus- .
tices, therefore, did not permit their policy preferences to dictate
their assessment of the legal issue before the Court. For instance,
Justice O'Connor voiced strong concern with the policy implications of her initial vote at Conference in one of environmental
law's most famous cases, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council. 101 The Chevron case involved the validity of EPA's decision to interpret the term "source" in the Clean Air Act in a way
that provided air pollution sources more flexibility in meeting the
Act's requirements. At Conference, O'Connor decried that
"[i]ndustry is suffering" and admitted that it was "very painful for
me. "102 She also described what the EPA was seeking to do as a
policy that "made sense as a concept."l03 Yet, she nonetheless
voted at Conference for NRDC, presumably because she understood that her own policy preferences could not trump her assess97 The Blackmun Papers, United States v. New Mexico, No. 77-510, Conference Notes
(Apr. 28, 1978) (Container No. 274).
98 [d. ("Little water law here. Just sta constr.")
99 [d. ("State depdt on toursim wI cut own throats fi try let streams dry up.")
100 The Blackmun Papers, United States v. New Mexico, No. 77-510, Letter from Justice
White to Justice Powell, Re: U.S. v. New Mexico, No. 77-510 (June 23, 1978) (Container
No.274).
101 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
102 The Blackmun Papers, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, No. 82-1005,
Conference Notes (1984) (Container No. 397) (dated "3-25-84" but that must be incorrect
because not argued until February 29, 1984).

103

[d.
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ment of the merits of the legal arguments. 104 (Because of the death
of Justice O'Connor's father a few weeks later and a related conflict of interest that arose in the administration of his estate, she
subsequently recused herself from the case. ).105
The same law/policy juxtaposition is evident in the Blackmun
papers relating to the Supreme Court's decision in TVA v. Hill,I06
often referred to as the "snail darter" case. At issue in TVA v. Hill
was the validity of issuing an injunction to prevent the completion
of a darn that everyone agreed would cause the extinction of a species of snail darter. The Court upheld the injunction in a ruling
often widely touted as a great victory for environmentalists in the
Supreme Court.107
The Blackmun Papers reveal, however, a Court persuaded that
the relevant statutory language compelled the result, but strikingly
hostile to the policy implications of upholding the injunction. The
author of the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger, originally
voted to summarily reverse in favor of lifting the injunction. !Os In a
handwritten note to Justice Blackmun, the Chief Justice described
the case in strictly policy-oriented terms: "Snail Darters vs. Elec.
Power. "109 During the Conference deliberations on the cases, two
of the Justices voting in favor of the injunction-Justices Marshall
and Stevens-were nonetheless sharply critical of the statutory policy. Justice Marshall said that "Congress can be a jackass" and
expressed the "hope" that "Congress will do something about
it."llo Justice Stevens characterized the statute as "stupid" and the
injunction as "ridiculous. "111
Then-Justice Rehnquist similarly displayed an ability to divorce
his views on the meaning of a particular statute from his views on
whether that same law expressed sound policy. In Union Electric v.
104

[d.

The Blackmun Papers, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, No. 82-1005,
Note to Conference from Justice O'Connor (June 14, 1984) (Container No. 397).
106 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
107 See Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escape for a Broad New
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES, supra note 77, at 109.
108 The B1ackmun Papers, TVA v. Hill, No. 76-1701, Docket Sheet, (Container No. 678);
Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10606, 10610-11 (Oct. 1993).
109 The Blackmun Papers, TVA v. Hill, No. 76-1701, Handwritten Note from Chief Justice to Harry Blackmun (undated) (Container No. 268).
110 The B1ackmun Papers, TVA v. Hill, No. 76-1701, Conference Notes (April 21,1978)
(Container No. 268) ("Cong can be a jackass, if it must" "Hope Cong wI do something ca
it").
111 [d. ("Ridiculous - hundreds v species + tie thgs up" "Stupid stat but - erodes + structure v our Gt ").
105
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EPA,112 the issue before the Court was whether the EPA could
reject a state plan to implement the Clean Air Act on the ground
that the state plan imposed too great an economic burden on
sources of air pollution in the state. The Court ruled that the EPA
lacked authority under the federal statute to reject a state implementation plan on the ground that it was unduly harsh. Then-Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion. At Conference, he
described the federal statutory scheme as "harsh and draconian,"113 but concluded that the result was mandated because the
statute was "not confused on this point. "114
In all of the thousands of pages in the Blackmun Papers relating
to environmental law cases, the Justice shown to be most influenced in his legal reasoning by his own policy views was Justice
Blackmun-perhaps for no other reason than that the Papers inevitably revealed the most about their own author. For instance, in
Fri v. Sierra Club,115 the issue before the Court was whether the
Clean Air Act of 1970 required the EPA to prevent significant
deterioration in the air quality in those areas of the nation that
otherwise met clean air standards necessary to protect public
health and welfare. The federal court of appeals had ruled in favor
of the Sierra Club's claim that the Act included such a mandate 1l6
and the Supreme Court ended up affirming, without opinion, by an
equally divided four to four vote (Justice Powell was recused from
the case).
.
The Blackmun Papers for the case include the Justice's notes to
himself in preparation for the oral argument in the case. The notes
list the various policy considerations supporting the Sierra Club's
legal argument, which the notes describe as the Justice's "gut reaction. "117 The policy considerations include:
• "We have a problem"
• "States would compete downwind'"
• "Pollution is no respecter of state boundaries"
• "This would force Industry"
• "Need to preserve some decent areas"
427 U.S. 246 (1976).
The Blackmun Papers, Union Electric v. EPA, No. 74-1452, Conference Notes (January 23, 1976) (Container No. 224) ("A harsh and draconian stat but n confused on this
point.").
114 [d.
115 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
116 4 BNA Env't Rep. Cases 1815 (1973) (per curiam).
117 The Blackmun Papers, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, No.72-804, Blackmun Handwritten Pre-Argument Notes (undated) (Container No.169).
112

113
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"Only by national action can we have effective action"
• "Doubt if the answer is to be found in balancing"
\9 "If affirmance is wrong, Congress can correct - resolve the
doubts in that direction"
• '''Promote and enhance' is general language but it is significant and has clear meaning, despite its being in the
preamble"118
e

Blackmun's notes include his summary of the competing considerations: "Policy for me is all one way. "119 He accordingly joined three
other Justices (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall) voting in favor of
the Sierra Club, which allowed the environmental group to preserve its victory by an equally divided Court. Justice Blackmun's
reasoning, if accurately reflected in his notes in the case, would
certainly seem to amount to the kind of judicial activism frequently
condemned in contemporary times: a judge deciding the meaning
of a federal statute based on his own consideration of the competing policy considerations rather than exclusively on indicia of congressional intent. In the early 1970s, however, such judicial
reasoning was, unlike today, far closer to the mainstream.
Regardless of the propriety of a judge (or Justice) using his or
her own policy preferences as a guidepost for resolving a legal issue
before a court, the most striking thing about the Blackmun Papers
is what is not present in the thousands of pages of documents. The
Papers reveal tremendous detail about the internal deliberations
within the Court on hundreds of environmental cases decided
between 1971 and 1994: a time period covering the emergence and
evolution of modern environmental law over the United States for
more than two decades. Yet, wholly absent from both the public
and now private documents is any significant awareness by any
member of the Court of the distinctive nature of environmental
law and the import for its emergence on other intersecting areas of
law.
More particularly, there is little to suggest that the Justices saw
environmental law as a new, emerging area of law requiring their
careful attention and stewardship. The environmental law cases
were instead more often described as a highly technical, complex,
and a tedious area of law to be shunted. This at least appears to
have been the dominant view of Justice Blackmun who, ironically,
118

Id.

1191d.
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was a Justice more favorably inclined than many others to the positions advanced by environmentalists.
In the Union Electric v. EPA case, for example, Blackmun commented in a note to himself that it would "not be a bad opinion to
take on" but also added the damning caveat "if I have to have one
in this general area."120 Blackmun's oral argument notes on several Clean Water Act cases repeatedly made clear his lack of
engagement. In International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, Blackmun
stated "I am sleepy,"121 a comment he repeated during the argument in Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation ("I am getting
sleepy");122 while in Chemical Manufacturers Assn v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, the Justice was more blunt: "What a
dull case. "123 The federal Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act fared no better. He described the oral argument in City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund (ED F) (in which I
presented the oral argument for ED F) as "[a]ll very dull";124 in
another RCRA case, City of Burlington v. Dague, the Justice's
fatigue was apparently even greater still: "On & on. This has been
a struggle today. I fight fatigue. "125
Blackmun's clerks echoed the same theme. One opined that a
National Environmental Policy Act case, in which the Court was
ruling against the environmentalists, "is not one, it seems to me, to
make a fuss about .... I don't think this is a case worthy of any
separate writing. "126 On whether the Court should grant review in
a Clean Water Act case pending before the Court on petition for a
writ of certiorari, another Blackmun clerk disparagingly wrote: "I
don't know what to advise you about these petitions. The clerks all
call them 'those horrible EPA cases.' "127
120 The Blackmun Papers, Union Electric v. EPA, No. 74-1542, Blackmun Pre-Argument
Notes (Jan. 13, 1976) (Container No. 224).
121 The Blackmun Papers, International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, No. 85-1233, Oral Argument Notes (Nov. 4, 1986) (Container No. 470).
122 The Blackmun Papers, Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, No. 86-473, Oral
Argument Notes (Oct. 5, 1987) (Container No. 490).
123 The Blackmun Papers, Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., No. 83-1013, Oral Argument Notes (Nov. 6, 1984) (Container No. 416).
124 The Blackmun Papers, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, No. 92-1639,
Oral Argument Notes (Jan. 19, 1994) (Container No. 639).
125 The Blackmun Papers, City of Burlington v. Dague, No. 91-810, Oral Argument
Notes (Apr. 21, 1992) (Container No. 602).
126 The B1ackmun Papers, Robertson v. Methow Valley, No. 87-1703, Memorandum from
"Ned" to Justice B1ackmun (Mar. 21, 1989) (Container No. 524).
127 The Blackmun Papers, Arkansas v. Oklahoma, No. 90-1262, Preliminary Memorandum to Justice B1ackmun from law clerk (Mar. 26, 1991) (Container No. 591) ("I don't
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In sum, the development of environmental law during the second half of the twentieth century in the United States may, as I
have argued elsewhere, represent one of the nation's greatest success stories in law: a legal revolution that redefined the relationship
between humankind and the natural environment and prevented,
within our own borders, the kind of environmental devastation witnessed elsewhere. The nation's highest Court, however, was
largely a bystander, buried in case-by-case analysis that lacked any
appreciation of the constructive significance of environmental law
for domestic law in general and, accordingly, for the many related
legal issues finding themselves before the Court.

v.

CONCLUSION

The riddles posed at the outset of this essay share a common
answer. The anomaly posited by Judge, now Chief Justice, Roberts
concerning the now famous hapless toad is just a more recent
instance of the kind of challenge facing environmental lawmaking
in the United States. The precise problem is that congressional
authority to enact such a law depends on the exercise of congressional Commerce Clause authority. As mentioned above, Congress does not possess general police power authority to enact laws
designed to promote public health and welfare. Instead, consistent
with the Framers' intention to fragment authority and limit the
centralization of lawmaking authority, congressional lawmaking
authority is expressly confined to several specific functions, one of
which is regulation of interstate commerce.
That is why the courts are now struggling to develop a coherent
legal theory for why protection of endangered species can be fairly
described as regulation of interstate commerce. The propriety of
such regulation is clear, as is the necessity for the federal government to playa leading role. The individual States alone cannot be
relied upon to address the issue. The small numbers of species and
their natural defiance of state borders require a sovereign authority
possessing broader jurisdiction. Yet, those same small numbers
and the simple fact that the public interest in species protection is
not necessarily tied to their commercial value render the Commerce Clause's analytical framework awkward at best. Chief Justice Roberts in the Rancho Viejo case was simply acknowledging
the extent of the resulting confusion in the lower courts and the
know what to advise you about these petns. The clerks all call them 'those horrible EPA
cases.' ")

HeinOnline -- 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 259 2005-2006

260

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 24:231

concomitant propriety of further judicial inquiry into possible
bases for upholding the Endangered Species Act's
constitutionality.
The second riddle, also described at the essay's outset, finds similar origin. Article III of the Federal Constitution provides for federal court jurisdiction only over "cases and controversies," which
the Supreme Court has ruled requires that the party bringing the
lawsuit establish a "concrete" and "imminent" injuryP8 The
nature of cause and effect within the ecosystem-because of how
cause and effect are so spatially and temporally spread out-makes
it very hard, however, for environmental plaintiffs to establish that
their injury is "concrete" or "imminent."
The expansive temporal and spatial dimensions of ecological
cause and effect defy traditional notions of concreteness and imminence as defined by the Court's precedent. Environmental plaintiffs can harbor sincere, strong feelings about species that they may
in fact never physically visit, but the injury they suffer from their
extinction is no less intense or legitimate. Justice Scalia may, as he
did writing the opinion for the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, mock such a connection as based on a "Linnaean leap."129
But, for many Americans whose life experiences demonstrate such
a connection with distant species, it is no leap at all.
The real disconnect is instead between the Court's precedential
touchstone for identifying the requisite injury for Article III standing and the kinds of causal connections sought to be vindicated by
modern environmental protection law. It is incumbent upon the
Court itself to bridge that gap and return to Article Ill's basic
requirement of ensuring an adequately adversarial judicial proceeding, lest the Constitution be unfairly read as presenting an
insurmountable obstacle to the enforcement of important federal
environmental mandates.
The final riddle introduced by the essay concerns the Clean
Water Act's regulation of discharges into navigable waters,
together with its lack of regulation of withdrawals of navigable
waters. Both may have dramatic impacts on the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of those waters that the Act seeks to safeguard, yet only the former is subject to a per se prohibition absent
a permit;130 the latter is left wholly unregulated by the federal stat128

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

129

[d. at 567 n.3.
33 U.S.c. § 1311 (1995).

130

HeinOnline -- 24 Va. Envtl. L.J. 260 2005-2006

2005]

The Nature of Environmental Law

261

ute. Here again, the answer is found in the nature of the nation's
lawmaking institutions, in particular the heavy emphasis the Constitution importantly places upon maintaining the essential sovereign authority of the States. State governments historically have
been preeminent on questions regarding water allocation authority-no doubt because of their enormous distributional implications-and have jealously guarded against perceived federal
governmental inroads. While the combined effect of a patchwork
of federal laws like the Endangered Species Act,131 Federal Power
Act,132 and Section 401 of the Clean Water Act 133 have no doubt
significantly eroded State monopoly over water allocation matters,134 the federal Clean Water Act's overall framework still
largely reflects that once sharp division of authority. Traditional
jurisdictional divides in lawmaking authority compete with the
nation's ability to fashion a potentially more coherent and comprehensive environmental protection policy.
Chief Justice Roberts represents the first Justice, let alone the
first Chief Justice, of a generation of lawyers who literally came of
age in the dawning of modern environmental law in the United
States. They witnessed firsthand the emergence of environmental
protection laws and their eventual settling into the legal landscape.
Only time will tell whether the Supreme Court under Chief Justice
Roberts will prove able to develop a coherent jurisprudence of
environmental law that reflects its nature, including its reflection of
human nature and the laws of nature. The focus may at times seem
exceedingly narrow-"the taking of a hapless toad that, for reasons
of its own, lives its entire life in California"135-but the stakes for
the nation and the world are increasingly large.

16 U.S.c. § 1538 (1988).
16 U.S.c. § 821 (1920).
133 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1977).
134 See, e.g., Sarah B. Van de Wetering & Robert W. Adler, New Directions in Western
Water Law: Conflict or Collaboration?, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 15 (2000).
135 Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
131

132
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